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Scope of China-Mali relationship 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China 
and Mali, both countries have maintained and increased co-
operation in the cultural, military, medical, political and 
economic fields. Economic relations between China and Mali are 
small by international standards, but significant to Mali itself. 
China is one of Mali’s four largest trading partners alongside 
Senegal, France and Cote d’Ivoire. Agricultural products, such 
as cotton and shea butter, are Mali’s largest exports to China. 
On the other hand, Mali’s imports from China consist mostly of 
mechanical, electric, chemical and pharmaceutical products. The 
Malian populace is also a considerable consumer of Chinese 
green  tea and other edible goods.  
Trade volume between the two countries hit US$ 300 million in 
2010 compared to US$ 145 million in 2005 (see graph 1 and 2 
for Mali’s current largest import and export partners). 
Diplomatically China has granted privileges to Malian citizens 
seeking Chinese visas, yet on the economic front there have 
been fears raised over Chinese dominance. Chinese construction 
firms, for example, have taken over a large section of the 
Malian construction sector, outcompeting Malian companies for 
local and foreign contracts.  
Effect of Chinese engagements in Mali 
As has been observed in other African countries, China’s 
engagement with Mali has had mixed effects. As yet the balance 
of benefits still seems to be towards the “mutual” benefit of 
both countries, however with increased economic activity, the 
potential for negative impacts from the relationship is 
increasing. Mali is a very small economy in comparison to China. 
It should thus be aware of real dangers such as possible 
stagnation of its own industrialisation, a growing dependence 
on Chinese manufacturing, dependence on Chinese construction 
companies and stifling of Mali’s small traders and 
entrepreneurial class. 
Chinese firms have, overall, had positive impacts on 
investment and employment opportunities in Mali. Both Chinese 
state-owned and private companies have created significant job 
opportunities in Mali. Construction firms employ a mainly local 
workforce even though managers are mostly Chinese. In other 
cases, for example the New Complexe Sucrier Du Kala Superieur 
SA SUKALA sugar mills, closed as a result of Structural 
Adjustments Programs (SAPs), have once more been reopened 
by making use of Chinese investments and loans. Chinese firms, 
especially those in the agro-industry sector, also provide sizable 
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Since 2000, China-Africa co-operation has seen a rapid increase in scope and size. The West African  
nation of Mali is one of the 50 African states with diplomatic relations with China; its experience allows 
for possible parallels with other African states in their engagement with a much more potent partner. 
Within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China and Africa outline economic, political and 
social engagements that are envisioned to help the establishment of a “win-win” partnership based on 
South-South solidarity. The China-Africa partnership has however come under increasing criticism from 
inside Africa; the perceived uni-directional flow of economic benefit in the relationship has been blamed 
for stagnation of  industrialisation and destruction of entrepreneurialism amongst others. Within the 
changing context, this policy briefing explores the relations between China and Mali, looking at the  
history of China-Mali relations and the positive and negative effects this relationship has had on Mali. 
This briefing concludes with recommendations on how the current relationship between China and Mali 
can be adapted to allow for more benefits on both sides. 
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revenues to the government in the form of taxes. They also 
create thousands of jobs both directly and indirectly in rural  
areas. The presence of Chinese firms has contributed to 
alleviating problems of unemployment in Mali, thereby 
contributing to reducing the trend of structural emigration from 
rural areas to urban areas. Rural to urban migration exerts 
severe pressure on the service delivery capacities of the Malian 
government. Additionally, Chinese involvement in the agro-
industry business in Mali has been beneficial to production 
outputs. Malian cotton producers have especially benefited from 
the Chinese contribution with increased yields. 
Poor Malian households have also benefited from the availability 
of inexpensive Chinese products coming into the market. In 
2010 Mali had a poverty headcount ratio at US$ 2/day (PPP) of 
78.7 per cent of its population according to the World Bank 
(2013). The possibility to purchase less expensive Chinese 
products allow for higher standards of living for Mali’s poor and 
also services a section of the market usually ignored by foreign 
investment and traditional formal economy retail chains. 
The involvement of Chinese firms, entrepreneurs and migrants 
in nearly all sectors of the Malian economy has however also 
resulted in some negative impacts. Chinese market infiltration 
has created fierce competition for Malian businesspeople, 
entrepreneurs and small traders. Though competition can 
sometimes be an effective tool for increased competitiveness, it 
can also destroy the creation or establishment of fledgling firms, 
leading to slowed, stagnant or even negative growth in 
manufacturing sectors. Malian construction firms and trading 
networks (as examples) have been calling on the Malian 
government to take protectionist measures to counter the 
perceived monopoly of Chinese firms in the Malian market and 
in doing so stimulate the development of local production. 
Within the Malian retail sector, an issue is that local 
entrepreneurs purchase a very large percentage of their 
merchandise from Chinese firms, leaving the Malians with the 
retail profits only. This process inhibits local production. Chinese 
migrants have also been able to outcompete Malians. Chinese 
success in the hospitality sector, for instance, has meant that 
the Malian-owned number of businesses in this sector has begun 
to shrink.  
Though there are clear benefits to the China-Mali relationship 
there are negative aspects that need to be considered by the 
Malian government and other Malian stakeholders. Long-term 
sustainability and mutual benefit of the China-Mali partnership 
will depend on the real mutual economic gains. 
China - Mali people to people relations 
Chinese immigration to Mali has been built on the long-standing 
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List 1: Quick glance of China-Mali relations 
1960: Mali gains independence from France 
1960: China-Mali establish diplomatic ties 
1961: China-Mali sign trade agreement 
1964: China-Mali sign “Friendship Treaty” 
2001: China-Mali sign sanitary cooperation agreement 
2001: China provides  Mali first debt relief 
2002: China-Mali sign economic and technical cooperation  
agreement 
2004: China-Mali sign scientific and technical cooperation  
agreement 
2006: China provides  Mali second debt relief 
2008: China provides Mali  third debt relief 
2010: China-Mali establish an Economic, Trade and Technological 
Joint  Committee 
2013/2014: China sends peacekeepers to Mali 
Box 1: Background of China-Mali relations 
Up until the colonial period, starting in the 13th century, Mali played host to one of the most frequented trade centres in West Afri-
ca. Indirect relations between China and modern Mali commenced in this period as is evident from archaeological finds such as 
Chinese ceramics in Timbuktu. Direct relations between the countries however only commenced in 1960, when Mali established 
diplomatic relations with mainland China a month after its independence from France, on 25 October 1960- a very unique decision 
for an African country. During the time of the first Malian president, Modibo Keita, the Malian government drafted socialist policies. 
Before the fall of Modibo Keita in 1968 by a coup, Mali was arguably one the African countries with the most openly pro-Chinese 
policies. Modibo was opposed, although not in a fundamentalist sense, to western hegemony and preferred Chinese ideology. 
Mali’s policy fitted China’s “ideology inclined” foreign policy of the time, further driven by anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity. 
However, a peculiarity existed in the relations between the two countries. Although the fall of Modibo did not affect the relations 
between the two countries, Mali also maintained relations with the former USSR and the West. Mali’s mix of diplomatic connections 
(with China, the old USSR and United States), has in the past led to the country being called politically opportunistic. Even in the 
face of such criticism, China does however seem to have a unique place in Mali’s foreign policy. China’s relationship with Mali since 
its birth as a nation-state—with development assistance, Mali’s long standing commitment to the One China policy and the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Mali’s unstinted support to China in international diplomacy continue to reverberate in the 
speeches during the visits of officials from both countries. Compared to many African countries, Mali has maintained good diplo-
matic relations with China since its independence. This has played a significant role in China’s continuing good relations with Mali 
and Chinese engagement in the country’s economic development.  
diplomatic relations between the two countries. Chinese 
migrants have received much attention, especially after the 
pillaging of Chinese-owned stores by Malians in 2005. However, 
the general feeling towards Chinese people in Mali does not 
seem to be one of general distrust or dislike. Polls show that an 
overwhelming majority of Malians are happy with their 
presence. A field study conducted by Kernen (2010:266) found 
that 93 per cent of Malians indicate an appreciation of the 
Chinese in the country, this is much higher than in other African 
countries. In South Africa the appreciation level was only 52 per 
cent. It is evident that China’s soft power is still strong in Mali 
and that Chinese are more welcomed in Mali than in many other 
African countries. 
Chinese immigration to Mali — traditionally a country of 
emigration – only begun picking in the 1990s. Although there is 
no real “Chinatown” in Mali, a Chinese trade centre was 
established that is intended to combine investment and trade 
functions between the two countries. The Malian and Chinese 
government mutually agreed to open their borders to each 
other’s citizens through agreements on cultural exchange. Mali 
often is “only a transit point” from a Chinese perspective, from 
where to leave for more lucrative opportunities in other African 
countries or even the West. However, Chinese migrants who 
stay often prosper. 
It is estimated that there are roughly 3000 Chinese living in 
Mali; however, it is difficult to pinpoint an exact number. 
Despite the small number of Chinese immigrants, their presence 
is disproportionally noticeable. This is especially true in the 
capital, Bamako, due to a heavy Chinese presence in the health 
sector, in the form of Chinese clinics. Chinese are also very 
visible within the  hospitality industries, as mentioned. 
Incidences such as the pillaging of Chinese shops and bars in 
Mali in 2005 after Mali lost a soccer game with Togo, seen by 
some analysts as a sign of growing resentment to China by 
Malians, should be analysed holistically; they cannot be directly 
taken as evidence for anti-Chinese sentiments. Chinese shops 
and bars were amongst others to be looted. Angry Malians 
pillaged several other shops nearby, where they could obtain 
easy cash, alcohol and other “desirable items”. The (unrelated) 
attacks on some Chinese residents in the same year should be 
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Box 2: Chinese response to the 2013 Malian insurrection 
In January 2012, Northern Mali was overrun by rebel groups, with the Malian government unable to halt the advance of the re-
bels. As a rapid response, France intervened militarily. On 18 June 2013 a peace agreement was reached which resulted in a 
shaky “official” end of the conflict, which opened the way for a UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabalization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA). The peace-keeping mission MINUSMA replaced  the African-led International Support Mission in July 2013. 
China contributed 135 peacekeepers to MINUSMA by December 2013; the number of Chinese soldiers was increased by another 
245 peacekeepers in January 2014. In contrast to previous Chinese peacekeeping missions, MINUSMA includes infantry, making 
this mission the first time that China has deployed security forces to support peacekeeping (excluding guard troops sent to South 
Sudan in January 2012). Beijing does not view its actions as military intervention or as a change in its foreign policy of non-
interference, arguing that the Malian government requested military assistance; sovereignty is protected because there is no in-
tention for regime change within Mali, Beijing stated. However, this is an evolution from previous practice.  
China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping missions out of the five permanent UN Security Council 
members. Other than negating criticism for “apathy” in conflict situations and increasing China’s standing in the international 
community, troop commitments provide the Chinese military with real world experience. Importantly China’s troops will also likely 
be far from any combat situation. In its Western regions, China has its own Islamic insurrection problems, which contributes to 
cautious behaviour; Beijing certainly wants to avoid becoming a target of any international militant Islamic movements. 
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viewed similarly. Criminals discriminate between targets based 
on financial grounds. The Chinese residents were aggressed 
based on such lucrative assessment as reported by the 
newspapers, for example with a reputation for carrying cash. 
Given the generally positive perception of Chinese in Mali by 
most Malians, the situation is not identical to those of Zambia or 
South Africa where anti-Chinese sentiments appear in diverse 
and more blatant forms.  
Conclusion 
In contrast to some other African countries, the relationship 
between China and Mali is currently still viewed as a positive 
one. Both countries and their citizens have a positive perception 
of one another, and they have maintained continuous relations 
since Mali’s independence.  
The China-Mali relationship is multi-faceted. Being one of 
China’s oldest allies on the African continent Mali has gained 
much from the relationship over the years. Nonetheless, the 
current economic situation between the two countries seems to 
indicate that the impact could become negative if Mali does not 
reconsider its “China-policy”. Unbalanced trade patterns with 
African countries exporting raw materials (even if profitable) 
and importing manufactured products still persist, just as they 
did in the colonial days.   
China’s investments are guided by its own commercial interests 
(arguably as can be expected from any nation state): however, 
these interests cannot be assumed to serve the interests of 
African countries. Even when the trade balance favours Mali, it 
loses out by being denied the opportunity (and at times the 
market) for value added goods.  
African countries are positioned within a globally fragmented 
production structure; their strife is rather to establish stable and 
value-added positions in the global supply chain, and more can 
be done in this regard within China-Africa relations.  
Recommendations 
Steep Chinese competition and the real benefits of the 
relationship are too strongly weighted in China’s favour, at the 
expense of small traders, entrepreneurs and even possible 
industrialists in Mali. If this is to be avoided, there are some 
measure that are recommended: 
 The Malian government should bring agreements 
with China in line with Mali’s Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. Mali currently implements 
its third generation GPRSP in which macro-economic 
stability and pro-poor growth form two of its five axes. In 
these sectors, Chinese activities can offer a lot to Mali. 
 
 
 Mechanisms for healthy competition should be 
created in Mali to protect local industry. An 
assistance programme that offers training and capital to 
Malian businesspeople operating in the informal sector 
should be established and also supported by Chinese 
funding. This programme’s aim should be to provide 
basic business know-how and continued expertise.  
Thereby, competition could be turned into a healthy 
force in Mali and aid the socio-economic development of 
the country.  
 Mali needs to renegotiate its trade deals with 
China to encourage technology transfer. Mali’s 
major imports from China include machinery, electronics, 
chemical and pharmaceutical products. Mali could aspire 
to technology and skills transfers in order to allow more 
local production. Increased technology access could in 
time lead to innovation, even if not to full-scale import 
substitution (a process that has lost much of its appeal). 
 Mali should continue the academic partnership 
with China. Mali should make use of the current 
exchange opportunities to send its students to China to 
be educated in areas related to Mali’s development needs 
and poverty alleviation plan. This process will allow for 
the transfer of skills. 
 Mali should regard China as one element in 
relations with various international partners. The 
discovery of oil in Northern Mali provides a very good 
opportunity for the country to exert some leverage in 
renegotiating its position vis-à-vis China. China’s 
increasing demand for oil increases Mali’s opportunity for 
agency. Maintaining good relations with the USA, France, 
Russia, India and South Africa in addition to China, for 
example, strengthens Mali’s diplomatic and economic 
opportunities. 
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